

MINDSHARE

2025 10-11
SEP

CYBERSECURITY
LEADERSHIP FORUM

Securing
Identity for
our Digital
Future

h_da

darmstadt university
of applied sciences


member of
-eur+
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
OF TECHNOLOGY

Nouri Alnahawi
Hochschule Darmstadt

**Post-Quantum
Cryptography in
eMRTDs**
Mindshare 2025

Motivation


Post-Quantum Cryptography



Motivation

eIDs & eMRTDs

- Electronic Identification
- Sensitive (Personal) Data
- Resource Constrained HW
- Built-in Security Mechanisms
- Built-in Cryptographic Support



Source: <https://www.nxp.com/products/MOB10>

eMRTDs

Hardware



Source: <https://www.nxp.com/products/SMARTMX3-P71D321>



Source: <https://www.mouser.de/new/infineon/infineon-mid-range-sbc-family/>

- RFID (NFC)
- PICC
- Micro-Controller Architecture
 - NXP60 / TCOS / SLC52 etc.
 - 8-12 KB RAM
 - 12-32 Bit CPU

eMRTDs

Specification of Some Certified Security Chips

Model	Date	ROM	EEPROM	Flash	RAM
NXP SmartMX2 P60	2010	586 KB*	144 KB*	—	11 KB*
NXP SmartMX3 P71	2017	150 KB*	—	344 KB*	12 KB
Infineon SLE78	—	444 KB*	—	628 KB*	18 KB*
Toshiba T6ND1	2010	64 KB	80 KB	—	6 KB
Toshiba T6NE1	2011	64 KB	80 KB	—	6 KB
ST Micro. ST31G480	2014	—	—	480 KB	12 KB

*Up to.

Adopted from [2]

eMRTDs

Security Protocols

Protocol	Security Goal	Cryptographic Mechanism
Passive Authentication	Check Authenticity of Chip Data	DS (on chip data)
Active Authentication	Check Chip Genuineness	Challenge-Response (DS)
Basic Access Control	Initial comms. channel, prevent eavesdropping	Challenge-Response (SKE)
PACE	Initial comms. channel, prevent eavesdropping	PAKE (incl. ephemeral DH)
Chip Authentication	Check Chip Genuineness	Ephemeral-Static DH
Terminal Authentication	Check terminal authorized to read secondary biometrics	Challenge-Response (DS)
Payload Comms.	Confidentiality / Data Integrity	SKE, MAC

Adopted from [1]

eMRTDs

Certificates & PKI

- Certificate Authorities per Country
- Signing and Verifying
 - CSCA => Root Cert. => Document Signer (DS) Cert.
 - DS Cert. => eMRTD Cert. (both on chip)
 - CVCA => Root Cert. => Document Verifier (DV) Cert.
 - DV Cert. => Terminal

eMRTDs

Cryptographic Primitives


Protocol	Cryptographic Mechanism	Algorithm	Recommended Key Length
PA	Hashing	SHA-2	384
	Digital Signatures	ECDSA	384
BAC	Encryption	3DES CBC-Mode	112
	Authentication	3DES Retail MAC	112
PACE	Key Agreement	ECKA	256
	Encryption	AES CBC-Mode	128
	Authentication	AES MAC	128
CA	Key Agreement	ECKA	256
	Encryption	AES CBC-Mode	128
	Authentication	AES MAC	128
TA	Hashing	SHA-2	256
	Digital Signatures	ECDSA	256
PKI	Hashing	SHA-2	512
	Digital Signatures	ECDSA	512

Key length measured in bits.

Adopted from [2]

eMRTDs


Authentication (Example)



**EAC: Extended Access Control
consisting of Terminal and Chip
Authentication**



Next Generation eMRTDs

Using PQC Primitives



Next Generation eMRTDs

PAKE pqm4 Impl.



Next Generation eMRTDs

Benchamrks on STM32 at 20 MHz

Protocol	Security Level	Runtime (ms)
OCAKE: Card as Initiator	ML-KEM-512 (m4fspeed)	980
	ML-KEM-768 (m4fspeed)	1.390
	ML-KEM-1024 (m4fspeed)	1.924
OCAKE: Card as Initiator	ML-KEM-512 (m4fstack)	986
	ML-KEM-768 (m4fstack)	1.400
	ML-KEM-1024 (m4fstack)	1.918

Adopted from [4]


Next Generation eMRTDs

Benchamrks on NXP SmartMX3 P71D600

CPU clock at roughly 12 to 13 MHz

Protocol	Security Level	Runtime (ms)
PACE-BrainpoolP256r1		217
OCAKE: Card as Responder	ML-KEM-512	652
	ML-KEM-768	995
	ML-KEM-1024	1406
OCAKE: Card as Initiator	ML-KEM-512	917
	ML-KEM-768	1500
	ML-KEM-1024	2257

Adopted from [1]



Next Generation eMRTDs


Certificates & PKI (Analysis)

scheme choice	CSCA/CVCA	ML-DSA-65	LMS-h20-192-w8	LMS-h20-256-w8
	DS	ML-DSA-65		
	C	ML-KEM-768		
pk _{CVCA}		1 952	56	64
Cert _{DS}	pk _{DS}	1 952	1952	1952
	Signature _{by CSCA}	3 293	1 140	1 772
Cert _C	pk _C	1 184	1 184	1 184
	Signature _{by DS}	3 293	3 293	3 293
sk _C		2 400	2 400	2 400
Total (Bytes)		14 074	10 025	10 665

Adopted from [1]

Next Generation eMRTDs

Conclusion



- PQC feasible on current HW
- Performance penalties!
- ML-KEM & ML-DAS for eMRTD
- LMS for CA
- Optimized HW?
- SCA & FI?

MINDSHARE

2025 10-11
SEP

CYBERSECURITY
LEADERSHIP FORUM

Securing
Identity for
our Digital
Future

h_da

darmstadt university
of applied sciences

member of
-eur+
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
OF TECHNOLOGY

Questions

Nouri Alnahawi
Hochschule Darmstadt
nouri.alnahawi@h-da.de

References

- [1] Alnahawi, Nouri, Melissa Azouaoui, Joppe W. Bos, Gareth T. Davies, SeoJeong Moon, Christine van Vredendaal, and Alexander Wiesmaier. "Post-Quantum Cryptography in eMRTDs: Evaluating PAKE and PKI for Travel Documents." *Cryptology ePrint Archive* (2025).
- [2] Alnahawi, Nouri, Nicolai Schmitt, Alexander Wiesmaier, and Chiara-Marie Zok. "Toward next generation quantum-safe eids and emrtds: A survey." *ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems* 23, no. 2 (2024): 1-28.
- [3] Fischlin, Marc, Jonas von der Heyden, Marian Margraf, Frank Morgner, Andreas Wallner, and Holger Bock. "Post-quantum Security for the Extended Access Control Protocol." In *International Conference on Research in Security Standardisation*, pp. 22-52. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023.
- [4] Alnahawi, Nouri, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Andreas Hülsing, and Silvia Ritsch. "Towards post-quantum secure PAKE-A tight security proof for OCAKE in the BPR model." In *International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security*, pp. 191-212. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024.
- [5] Pradel, Gaëtan, and Chris J. Mitchell. "Post-quantum certificates for electronic travel documents." In *European Symposium on Research in Computer Security*, pp. 56-73. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020.